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In 2017, Congress changed the quarterly fee calculation for disbursements, codified in 28
U.S.C. § 1930(a)(6)(B) (the “2017 Amendment”) which increased quarterly fees in Chapter 11
cases only in those districts operating under the U.S. Trustee program.7 The Judiciary Committee
report indicates this increase was because of the decline in bankruptcy filings that have
traditionally funded a surplus of the U.S Trustee program.8 Congress, however, did not mandate
this fee increase in those districts operating under the Bankruptcy Administrator program.9
Instead, Congress left the decision to the Judicial Conference to impose such fees in their
discretion.10
This divergent fee increase has resulted in numerous Constitutional challenges by debtors
and the United States Supreme Court has granted certiorari to resolve the Constitutionality
issue.11 This memorandum summarizes the Constitutional conflict between the courts that has
arisen when addressing the uniformity issue under the Bankruptcy Clause of the Constitution.
Part I discusses Congressional authority over bankruptcy laws under the Bankruptcy Clause.
Parts II and III discuss the limitation on Congressional bankruptcy power. Part IV discusses the
circuit split that has arisen over the 2017 Amendment.
DISCUSSION
I.

Congressional Authority Over Bankruptcy Laws

Congress has broad authority under the Bankruptcy Clause of the Constitution, which grants
Congress the authority “[t]o establish . . . uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies throughout
the United States.”12 The United States Supreme Court has adopted a broad and expansive

7

See 28 U.S.C. § 1930(a)(6)(B) (2017).
See H.R. Rep No. 115-130, pt. D, at 7 (2017).
9
See 28 U.S.C. § 1930(a)(7).
10
11 U.S.C. § 1930(a)(7) (“In districts that are not a part of a United States trustee region . . . the Judicial
Conference of the United States may require . . . .”).
11
See Siegel , 996 F.3d at 156, cert. granted, 142 S. Ct. 752 (U.S. Jan. 10, 2022) (No. 21-441).
12
U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
8
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definition of bankruptcy to mean “subject of the relations between an insolvent or nonpaying or
fraudulent debtor and his creditors, extending to his and their relief.”13 This broad power given to
Congress was at the forefront of the framer’s minds and was specifically included in the
Federalist Papers in defense of the new Constitution.14 While Congress’s authority under the
Bankruptcy Clause is expansive it contains “an affirmative limitation or restriction on Congress’
power: bankruptcy laws must be uniform throughout the United States.”15
II.

Affirmative Limitation of Uniformity Still Allows Flexibility

Prior to 1982, the United States Supreme Court never struck down a bankruptcy law for
failing to be uniform.16 The court has stated “[t]he uniformity requirement is not a straitjacket
that forbids Congress to distinguish among classes of debtors, nor does it prohibit Congress from
recognizing that state laws do not treat commercial transactions in a uniform manner.”17
Furthermore “[t]he Uniformity provision does not deny Congress the power to take into account
differences that exist between different parts of the country, and to fashion legislation to resolve
geographically isolated problems.”18 Thus, while there is a uniformity requirement explicit in the
Constitution, Congress has flexibility to address problems they find in non-uniform ways.19
III.

Outer Limits on Uniformity Requirement

The first and only time the Supreme Court struck down a law on a bankruptcy uniformity
challenge was in 1982 when Congress adopted a law that applied to only one debtor.20 This case

13
Ry. Lab. Executives’ Ass’n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457, 466 (1982) (quoting Wright v. Union Cent. Life. Ins. Co.,
304 U.S. 502, 513–14 (1938)).
14

See The Federalist No. 42 (James Madison) (“The power of establishing uniform laws of bankruptcy is so
intimately connected with the regulation of commerce . . . .”).
15

Ry. Lab. Executives’ Ass’n, 455 U.S. at 469.
Id.
17
Id.
18
Reg’l Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 159 (1974).
19
See Ry. Lab. Executives’ Ass’n, 455 U.S. at 469.
20
See id. at 470 (“By its terms, RITA applies to only one regional bankrupt railroad. Only Rock Island’s creditors
are affected by RITA’s employees protection provisions and only employees of the Rock Island may take benefit of
the arrangement.”).
16
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was distinguished from an earlier case that addressed a similar uniformity challenge in the Reg’l
Rail Reorganization Act Cases. In that case the court upheld a law that applied only to railroads
in the Northeast.21 The court found that the law applied uniformly because there were no other
reorganization proceedings pending outside of that defined area and was addressing a
“geographically isolated problem.”22 Whereas in Ry. Lab. Executives’ Ass’n, “The employee
protection provisions of RITA cover neither a defined class of debtors nor a particular type of
problem, but a particular problem of one bankrupt railroad.”23 The court stated that “[t]o survive
scrutiny under the bankruptcy clause, a law must at least apply uniformly to a defined class of
debtors.”24
IV.

Circuit Split Over Uniformity of the 2017 Amendment

A. The Fourth and Fifth Circuit’s decision to uphold the 2017 Amendment as
Constitutionally uniform within the “geographically isolated problem” exception
The first circuit court to rule on the Constitutionality of the 2017 Amendment was the Fifth
Circuit in the case of In re Buffets.25 The court started its Constitutionality analysis by rejecting
the argument the 2017 Amendment is not a law on bankruptcies and thus not subject to the
uniformity requirement.26 However, the court noted that this is an argument that has not been
readily accepted.27 The court concluded, bankruptcy is essentially “the relation[] between an
insolvent or nonpaying or fraudulent debtor, and his creditors extending to his and their relief”
which the 2017 Amendment directly implicates such relationship.28

21

Reg’l Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. at 159.
Id.
23
Ry. Lab. Executives’ Ass’n, 455 U.S. at 470–71.
24
Id. at 473.
25
In re Buffets, L.L.C., 979 F.3d 366 (5th Cir. 2020).
26
Id. at 377.
27
Id. (finding that “the fee increase has a direct effect on what creditors receive—less than before”).
28
Id. (quoting Wright v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 502, 513-14 (1938)).
22
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The Buffets Court went on to analyze the question of uniformity and found no such
uniformity issue.29 The court’s reasoning are the same arguments advanced in the Reg’l Rail
Reorganization Act Cases and Ry. Lab. Executives’ Ass’n that call for “flexibility” in
congressional power.30 The court rejected the argument advanced by In re Buffets that
geographic uniformity is demanded by the Constitution and made clear that geographical
differences will only violate the Constitution when they are “arbitrary.”31
Again, the court advanced the argument derived from Reg’l Rail Reorganization Act Cases
that put forth the “geographically isolated problem” exception.32 The court saw the
“geographically isolated problem” as the underfunding in the Trustee District.33 Therefore,
because this underfunding was a problem in those districts that used the Trustee and not those in
the Administrator Districts, Congress provided sufficient justification that addressed the funding
in those districts.34 The fact that there was a geographical difference was merely incidental to the
program specific distinction Congress drew.35 Subsequent to the Fifth Circuit’s ruling, other
courts have followed this same analytical framework.
Following the structure of the Fifth Circuit’s decision in the Buffets case, the Fourth Circuit
similarly upheld the 2017 Amendment against a Constitutional challenge.36 The Fourth Circuit,
like the Fifth, rejected the claim that the 2017 Amendment was not a law on the subject of
bankruptcies.37 Thus, they likewise had to address the uniformity problem raised and did so in

29

Id.
Id. at 378 (quoting Reg’l Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. at 158).
31
Id. (citing In re Reese, 91 F.3d 37, 39 (7th Cir. 1996)).
32
Id.
33
Id. at 378.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
See Siegel, 996 F.3d 156.
37
Id. at 164.
30
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the same manner as the Fifth Circuit.38 The Fourth Circuit again relied on the “geographically
isolated problem” exception derived from the Reg’l Rail Reorganization Act Cases to counter the
arbitrary claim.39 The court found that Congress permissibly tailored the solution to meet the
problem of the underfunded districts “to ensure that the U.S. Trustee program is sufficiently
funded by its debtors rather than by the taxpayers.40 The Fourth Circuit like the Fifth Circuit saw
this distinction not as a geographic one but one that is “program-specific distinction that only
indirectly has a geographic impact.”41
B. The Eleventh Circuit has upheld the 2017 Amendment as Constitutionally uniform on
other grounds
The Eleventh Circuit also upheld the Constitutionality of the 2017 Amendment but
recognized that it departed from the reasoning employed by the Fourth and Fifth Circuits.42
While the court made clear it is not relying on the “geographically isolated problem” exception it
noted that those circuit courts that have held that “failure to qualify for the geographically
isolated problem exception necessarily means that a uniformity violation has occurred” is
inconsistent with the “inherent flexibility of the uniformity requirement . . . .”43
The Eleventh Circuit rested its conclusion as to the Constitutionality on numerous other
factors.44 As made clear by the Fourth and Fifth Circuit decisions, the court reiterated the inherit
flexibility for Congressional action under the Bankruptcy Clause.45 The court stated that the
Bankruptcy Clause is a limitation on Congresses power and inaction by another branch of

38

Id. at 165 (“the Fifth Circuit’s Buffets decision correctly resolved the uniformity issue concerning the 2017
Amendments quarterly fee increase . . . .”).
39
Id. (citing Buffets, 979 F.3d at 377).
40
Id. at 166–67.
41
Id. at 166.
42
United States Trustee Region 21 v. Bast Amron LLP (In re Mosiac Mgmt. Grp.), No. 20-12547, 2022 U.S. App.
LEXIS 1239, at *68 (11th Cir. Jan. 14, 2022).
43
Id. at *69 n.32.
44
Id. at *59.
45
Id. at *60.
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government doesn’t modify or repeal Congressional acts.46 The court further articulated that if
there was to be a Constitutional problem, that problem must be attributed to the actions of the
Judicial Conference or their inaction in applying fees to the Administrator Districts.47 Thus, the
court found that because the Judicial Conference was charged with the legal authority to
implement the increased fees and failed to do so immediately after the 2017 Amendment passed
by Congress did not violate the Bankruptcy Clause.48 The court further held that the Judicial
Conference’s inaction did not violate the Constitution because there is “well-established”
precedent that allows for different treatment of similar debtors in different states.49 The “wellestablished” principals the court spoke of are state exemptions prescribed by state law.50 In both
circumstances of state law exemptions and of the disparity caused by the 2017 Amendment, the
problem was with an actor other than Congress and Congress could not have foreseen the
Judicial Conferences inaction.51
More persuasive for the Eleventh Circuit was the temporary nature of the disparity that pales
in comparison to the ongoing disparity due to state exemptions.52 The court saw this as a
fortiori.53 “[E]ven that ongoing and permanent disparity does not violate the flexible uniformity
requirement, we believe it follows, a fortiori, that there is no violation in the context of the
instant temporary disparity which was promptly remedied by Congress when it unexpectedly
occurred.”54 Thus, the Eleventh Circuit justified its Constitutionality decision first because the

46

Id. at *61.
Id.
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Id. (quoting Ry. Lab. Executives’ Ass’n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457, 469 (1982)) (“Congress can give effect to the
allowance of exemptions prescribed by state law without violating the uniformity requirement.”).
51
Id. at *62.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Id. at *63.
47
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inaction of the Judicial Conference in adopting the fees was not a result of congressional actions
violating uniformity.55 Second, because of state exemptions that already allow for the different
treatment of different debtors.56 Finally, because of the relatively short time disparity for which
the debtors were treated differently.57
C. Lower court decisions upholding the 2017 Amendment as Constitutional
Numerous lower courts have also upheld the constitutionality of the 2017 Amendment.58 The
discussion below is an examination of the lower courts that have upheld the constitutionality of
the 2017 Amendment for similar reasons as the Fourth and Fifth Circuits.
The Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware upheld the constitutionality of the 2017
Amendment on the grounds that it did apply uniformly to a class of debtors and used the
“geographically isolated problem” exception.59 In asserting that the law did apply uniformly to a
class of debtors it distinguished the 2017 Amendment from the law in Ry. Lab. Executives’
Ass’n.60 Whereas the law in that case applied to only one debtor, here the 2017 Amendment
applied uniformly to a class of debtors.61 Like the Eleventh Circuit, the court also narrowed the
question as to whether the 2017 Amendment was uniform.62 The court answered this question in
the affirmative, holding that the 2017 Amendment is uniform because it applies “with the same
force and effect in every place where the subject of it is found . . . all UST districts.”63 Like the
Fourth and Fifth Circuits, the court found that it was appropriate for Congress to address the

55

Id. at *61.
Id. at *62.
57
Id. at *63.
58
See In re Exide Techs., 611 B.R. 21 (Bankr. D. Del. 2020); In re ASPC Corp., 631 B.R. 18 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio,
2021); Acadiana Mgmt. Grp., LLC v. U.S., 151 Fed. Cl. 121 (Fed. Cl. 2020).
59
In re Exide Techs., 611 B.R. at 36–37.
60
Id. at 36.
61
Id.
62
Id. at 37.
63
Id.
56
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“geographically isolated problem” of the underfunding of the U.S. Trustee system with an
increase in fees in those districts.64
Likewise, the bankruptcy court for the Southern District of Ohio upheld the 2017
Amendment as constitutional.65 The Ohio bankruptcy court relied on the “geographically isolated
problem” exception just as a majority of other courts have done so and on the same reasoning as
the Eleventh Circuit that the action Congress took did not present a uniformity problem.66 The
“geographically isolated problem” was the underfunding in the U.S. Trustee system fund and
only existed in those districts that used the U.S. Trustee.67 Thus, because of the flexibility that
Congress has in fashioning legislation to address such problems, “Congress had the power to fix
the underfunding problem where it found it.”68 Persuasive also for the court was that the 2017
Amendment applied uniformly to a class of debtors and is not like the single debtor targeted
from Ry. Lab. Executives’ Ass’n.69 Finally, just as the Eleventh Circuit did the court here did not
blame Congress for the divergent fees, but the Judicial Conference.70 “[A]ctions that were or
were not taken as part of the implementation of the statute do not make the statute nonuniform.”71 The Judicial conference treated the debtors differently and did not modify what
Congress had done when they enacted the 2017 Amendment.72
The Court of Federal Claims has also ruled as to the Constitutionality of the 2017
Amendment and adopted the same reasoning set forth in the Buffets case.73 The court did not

64

Id.
In re ASPC Corp., 631 B.R. 18.
66
Id. at 33–35.
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
Id. at 34.
71
Id.
72
Id. at 35.
73
Acadiana Mgmt. Grp., LLC v. U.S., 151 Fed. Cl. 121 (Fed. Cl. 2020).
65
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analyze the 2017 Amendment with their own analysis but simply adopted the reasoning directly
from the Fifth Circuit’s opinion.74
D. The Second and Tenth Circuits decision that the 2017 Amendment is unconstitutionally
non uniform
The Second Circuit and the Tenth Circuit have ruled that the 2017 Amendment is
unconstitutional because it violates the Bankruptcy Clause of the Constitution.75 The Second
Circuit was the first circuit court to declare the amendment unconstitutional and criticized the
Fourth and Fifth Circuits for finding otherwise.76
The Second Circuit rejected the argument that Congress mandated equal fees when it adopted
the 2017 Amendment across both systems, and it was simply the Judicial Conferences delay in
implementing the increased fees that led to the uniformity issues.77 The court declined this
argument because it “asks [] [the court] to ignore the distinction between the ‘shall’ used in §
1930(a)(6) and the ‘may’ used in § 1930(a)(7).”78 The court found that the language was chosen
for a specific reason, setting apart different fees, and Congress did so intentionally.79 Thus, the
grant of such permissive authority violated the uniformity requirement, and the court had to
declare it unconstitutional.80
The Second Circuit also addressed the “geographically isolated problem” exception and
likewise rejected that argument.81 Even failing to accept this argument, the court does recognize

74

See id. at 131 (“The court therefore applies the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning to each of plaintiffs’ claims in this
case.”).
75
See Clinton Nurseries of Md., Inc. v. Harrington (In re Clinton Nurseries, Inc.), 998 F.3d 56; In re John Q.
Hammons Fall 2006, LLC, 15 F.4th 1011 (10th Cir. 2021).
76
See Clinton Nurseries of Md., Inc., 998 F.3d at 68 (“We are concerned, however, that the bankruptcy courts and
the Buffets and Circuit City opinions have overlooked a critical distinction.”).
77
Id. at 65.
78
Id. at 66.
79
Id.
80
Id. at 67.
81
Id.
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the flexibility that exists in the Bankruptcy Clause.82 Even recognizing that such flexibility exits
the court found that this exception was limited by Ry. Lab. Executives’ Ass’n. and “must at least
apply uniformly to a defined class of debtors.”83 Therefore, because the 2017 Amendment
applied to debtors whose disbursements exceed a million dollars and those classes exist across
both district systems the 2017 Amendment does not meet the “geographically isolated problem”
exception.84 “Two debtors, identical in all respects save the geographic locations in which they
filed for bankruptcy, are charged dramatically different fees.”85
The Tenth Circuit similarly declared the 2017 Amendment unconstitutional for reasons that
follow the reasoning of the Second Circuit.86 The court rejected the application of the
“geographically isolated problem” exception for the same reason the Second Circuit did, because
the same class of debtors existed in both Trustee Districts and Bankruptcy Administrator
Districts.87
E. Lower court decisions striking down the 2017 Amendment as unconstitutional
The District Court for the Central District of California adopted similar reasoning employed
by the Second Circuit.88 “The Court is not persuaded by the UST’s argument, or, respectfully, by
the reasoning of other courts, that the relevant class of debtors for the purpose of the 2017
Amendment is Chapter 11 debtors in UST districts.”89 The district court admonished Congress
for failing to provide “any justification at all for enacting a non-uniform bankruptcy law” and

82

Id. at 67–68 (quoting Reg’l Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 159 (1974)) (“[T]he uniformity clause
was not intended to hobble Congress by forcing it into nationwide enactments to deal with conditions calling for
remedy in certain regions.”).
83
Id. at 68 (quoting Ry. Lab. Executives’ Ass’n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457, 473 (1982)).
84
Id. at 69.
85
Id.
86
See In re John Q. Hammons Fall 2006, LLC, 15 F.4th 1011 (10th Cir. 2021).
87
Id. at 1024.
88
See USA Sales, Inc. v. Off. of U.S. Tr., 532 F. Supp. 3d 921 (C.D. Cal. 2021).
89
Id. at 946.
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thus “regardless of the standard of scrutiny under the Bankruptcy Clause, Congress’s’ decision
can only be considered to be irrational and arbitrary.”90
CONCLUSION
Courts are divided as to the constitutionality of the 2017 Amendment. The majority of
courts have upheld the 2017 Amendment finding no Constitutional uniformity issue. Other
courts, however, disagree and found a Constitutional uniformity issue. In June of 2022 the
Supreme Court of the United States issued the court’s unanimous opinion and found the fee
increase was not geographically uniform.91 The court remanded the case back to the Fourth
Circuit to address the remedy regarding the fees.92

90

Id. (citations omitted).
Siegel v. Fitzgerald (In re Cir. City Stores, Inc.), 596 U.S. __ (2022).
92
Id.
91
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